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ABSTRACT 
 
      The 2010 Supreme Court decision in the case Citizens United v. FEC brought about 
major changes in U.S. Campaign finance law, most infamously the creation and 
proliferating of Super PACs, a new vehicle for outside spending. In this thesis, I 
investigate the impacts of the Citizens United decision on electoral outcomes in U.S. 
House of Representatives races. I analyzed campaign finance data from the 2006, 2014, 
2016, and 2018 election cycles for three categories of House races: open seats, 
competitive seats, and seats that fall within a specific spending ratio between the top two 
vote getters. I conducted a number of comparisons of the winning percentages of 
candidates with more PAC support (in individual races) and more outside support (in 
individual races), between election cycles and seat categories. I also compared 
incumbent-party winning percentages to PAC and outside-spending winning percentages, 
to look for differences between the impact on incumbents and challengers. I found that 
outside spending is more aligned with winning candidates in the competitive seats 
categories than PAC spending. However, in the other categories there is no substantial 
difference between PAC support and outside support. I also found that the Citizens 
United decision appears to be helping challengers try to unseat incumbents by making it 
easier to inject large sums of outside money into races. When two candidates are very 
evenly matched, having more outside spending can help a challenger unseat an 
incumbent, but if the incumbent has numerous factors favoring them, having more 
outside support will not substantially help the challenger. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     On January 21, 2010, the United States Supreme Court announced its decisions in one 
of the most famous/infamous Supreme Court cases of the twenty-first century, Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission. At issue was the legality of independent 
expenditures by corporations, labor unions, and nonprofits to attack or support political 
candidates. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 placed restrictions on 
corporations, labor unions, and nonprofits attacking or promoting candidates with 
independent expenditures. The Citizens United organization sought an injunction against 
the FEC from using the BCRA to stop the broadcasting of its film Hillary: The Movie. 
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where, in a 5-4 decision, the Court held 
that the First Amendment allows corporations, and presumably non-profits and labor 
unions, to provide independent expenditures to promote or attack political candidates 
without government restrictions. The Citizens United decision overturned previous 
Supreme Court campaign finance regulation precedent, namely Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce and sections of McConnell v. FEC, redefining campaign finance 
regulation in America.  
     The Citizens United decision has been contentiously debated ever since it was issued. 
Some people applaud the decision as a victory for free speech. Others condemn the 
decision as a threat to democracy, arguing that it will lead to unlimited campaign 
contributions by corporations which will have a powerful (negative) impact on American 
politics. It is well known that in a congressional race the candidate with more financial 
support wins much more often than the candidate with less financial support. Citizens 
2 
	
United opened the floodgates to money from corporations (and also labor unions, and 
nonprofits) to be added to the political arena to pay for electioneering communications to 
attack or promote political candidates.  
     What I investigate in my thesis is how the changes allowed by the Citizens United 
decision affected electoral outcomes in House of Representatives races. In this thesis, I 
analyze and compare campaign finance data from one election cycle before the Citizens 
United decision (2006) to one election cycle after the Citizens United decision (2014). I 
compare the success of U.S. House candidates with the most PAC support (in individual 
U.S. House of Representatives races) to the success of U.S. House candidates with the 
most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 group support (in individual U.S. House of 
Representatives races), comparing 2006 to 2014. My thesis question is, in U.S. House of 
Representatives races since the Citizens United decision, are the candidates with the most 
Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 groups support (in individual races) winning 
more often than the candidates with the most traditional PAC funding in House of 
Representatives races before the Citizens United decision. 
     Political Action Committees (PACs) are political organizations that raise money and 
then give that money directly to candidates and party committees, or spend it on 
independent expenditures. PACs often represent business, labor, or ideological interests. 
There are limits on how much money a PAC can give to candidate committees, national 
party committees, other PACs, and how much money they can receive from individuals, 
party committees, and other PACs (opensecrets.org). The first PAC was formed in 1944 
by the Congress of Industrial Organizations to support Franklin D. Roosevelt’s re-
election bid.  
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     The Citizens United decision applied to SuperPACs (created not long after the 
Citizens United decisions by the Speechnow.org v. FEC decision) 501 (c) organizations, 
and 527 groups. Super PACs are organizations that can raise an unlimited amount of 
money from corporations, unions, non profits, and individuals to spend on elections 
advocating for or against candidates. Super PACs cannot donate directly to a campaign or 
work with a campaign. The central differences between standard PACs and SuperPACs 
are that Super PACs can receive unlimited funding from a particular source; however, 
unlike standard PACs, Super PACs cannot contribute directly to or coordinate with 
campaign committees in any way.  
     The second type of political organizations are 501 (c) groups, which are tax-exempt 
non-profit organizations that can engage in varying degrees of political activity based on 
the type. However, political activity cannot be the foremost activity of any type of 501 (c) 
group. 501 (c) groups can receive unlimited donations from corporations, or individuals, 
and do not have to disclose the source of their funding. 501 (c) nonprofits cannot work 
with campaigns, and cannot expressly tell voters who to vote for. The most common type 
of 501 (c) group is the 501 (c) (4) also called a “social welfare organization,” which can 
engage in political activity as long as political activity is not its primary purpose (irs.gov).  
     The third type of political organizations are 527 groups, which are organizations 
whose purpose is to influence political issues, candidate elections, policy debates, or 
political appointments. 527 groups can raise unlimited amounts of money from 
corporations, unions, and individuals, but they must disclose their contributors. Like 
Super PACs and 501 (c) s, 527 groups cannot coordinate with candidates or party 
committees. 527 groups can be tax exempt if the follow IRS guidelines (irs.gov). The 
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data I analyzed for my thesis from the 2014 races is a combination of funds from Super 
PACs, 501(c) nonprofits, and 527 groups. 
Table 1 
Political Organizations Table (NALC, 2015)  
 
Source: Bloomberg Politics, July 31, 2015; Opensecrets.com: Center for Responsive Politics. 
 
     I chose the topic of campaign finance and more specifically Citizens United and how 
it has impacted the electoral outcomes in House of Representatives races, because 
campaign finance is a very important aspect of the American political system. Campaign 
finance is important because political donors can have influence over politicians. It is 
very expensive to run a political campaign for national office in the U.S. Campaigns are 
constantly asking for donations.       
     According to the Center for Responsive Politics in 2016, the average amount of 
money spent by a winning House of Representatives candidate was $1.3 million while the 
average cost of a winning Senate candidate was $10.4 million (Kim, 2016). The $1.3 
million and $10.4 million are only the amount spent by the campaigns, therefore those 
numbers do not include outside spending form organizations like PACs, Super PACs etc. 
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The same is true of non campaign affiliated political groups like Super PACs, 501(c) 
nonprofits, and 527 groups who are looking for funding to run advertisements for or 
against certain candidates or issues. Super PACs can receive unlimited contributions from 
a singular person or corporation. While not affiliated with a specific campaign, 
candidates can find out who is supporting them through advertisements, which gives the 
donors who write the large checks some influence. Additionally, Super PACs are often 
run by former staffers (or even family members a candidate that they are supporting 
(opensecrets.org, 2017). 
     The Citizens United decision changed campaign finance regulation in America, 
leading to the proliferation of Super PACs (which were created by Speechnow.org v. 
FEC decision). Super PACs have, in turn, led to a substantial increase in the amount of 
money in politics and the amount of secret money in politics (Overby, 2012). In the 
American republican system, the voters trust that politicians will represent their interests 
in Washington, D.C. Yet, that is not always the case, because a donor can often be a 
louder voice in a politician’s ear than their constituents. Donors can persuade politicians 
to put their interests first, though it is important to note that there are plenty of situations 
where the interest of the donor will coincide with the interests of the majority of 
constituents. When/if the top donors are able to influence how politicians behave while in 
office, democracy is weakened. A system in which politicians foremost represent the 
interest of the highest bidder(s) sounds like an idea from a dystopian book or movie.  
     The second reason that I am interested in campaign finance is that it is a behind-the-
scenes aspect of political campaigns. It takes a lot of money to run a political campaign, 
but it is not a topic candidates like to discuss. Last summer, I had an internship with a 
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Senate campaign, it really opened my eyes to how expensive it can be to run a political 
campaign. Even with scores of unpaid interns and volunteers, the costs quickly add up. 
Candidates will often apologize for asking for money when asking for money. But 
without funding, a candidate has very little chance of being able to successfully advertise 
themselves to the voters.  
     The data analyzed in this thesis comes from the Federal Election Commission by way 
of the Center for Responsive Politics. The data are from the 2006, 2014, 2016, and 2018 
election cycles. I started with the data analysis with data from 2006 and 2014, and later 
analyzed data from 2016 and 2018 upon recommendation from my thesis committee. I 
chose the 2006 and 2014 election cycles because they are the two full election cycles 
closest before and after the Citizens United decision without a presidential race. I 
compare the PAC funds of the House of Representatives in 2006 to the Super PAC, 501 
(c) organizations, and 527 groups (the data from these three types of groups are combined 
into one category) for the 2014 House races. For the Literature Review chapter, I use 
journal articles and book chapters have found on JSTOR and WPSA, along with reports 
from nonprofits organizations, including: Center for Responsive Politics, Brennan Center, 
Sunlight Foundation, Center for Public Integrity, Committee for Economic Development, 
Bipartisan Policy Center.  
     The data analyzed are reported to the Federal Election Commission by candidate 
campaigns, party committees, PACs, Super PACs, 501 (c) nonprofits, 527 groups etc… 
and then made available for public access by the FEC. The data are reported to FEC 
because it is required by U.S. campaign finance regulations. U.S. campaign finance 
regulations are an extensive set of laws that regulate the financial side of political 
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campaigns. Campaign finance laws cover three main areas. First, the raising of money by 
campaigns and non campaign affiliated organizations to be spent on campaigns. Second, 
the spending of money for and against campaigns. Third, the disclosure of funds to be 
spent on campaigns (though the disclosure aspect does not apply to all organizations that 
raise and spend money for political campaigns). There are two major pieces of campaign 
finance regulation in the United States, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (plus 
the 1974 amendments) and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002).   
     The passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) marked the beginning of 
the modern era of campaign finance regulation in the United States. The Act regulates 
campaign finance in a number of ways. First, its sets limits for the amount of money a 
federal candidate or party committee can receive from an individual or a corporation, and 
limits the amount that a individual or corporation can give in total (distributed over a 
number of candidates and party committees) per election cycle. Second, the Act mandates 
disclosure of contributions to, and expenditures by, candidates running for federal office. 
Third, the Act placed bans on certain corporate and union contributions, speech and 
expenditures (Jones, 2017). Fourth, the Act created the basic legislative framework for 
Political Action Committees (PACs). Additionally, the Act gave the Justice Department 
the authority to prosecute violations of it. In the first election cycle after its passage 
(1972) there were 7,000 cases of violations of FECA referred to the Justice Department, 
however only five cases were prosecuted (fec.gov).  
     Following the Watergate Scandal, the FECA was amended in 1974. The Federal 
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 had five central sections: additional limits 
on contributions to candidates in federal elections, provide matching funds for 
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presidential primaries, limits on the amount of speaking honorariums, stricter campaign 
finance reporting and disclosure, creation of the Federal Election Commission 
(fordlibrarymuseum.gov, 1974). 
     The second major piece of campaign finance legislation in United States history is the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002), which amended sections of the FECA. The 
goal of the BCRA was to reduce the amount and influence of money in federal U.S. 
elections, so that the voices of ordinary Americans could compete with large campaign 
donors. The Act sought to accomplish this goal by placing limits on soft money being 
used by political party committees for advertising (Strickland). Soft money is money that 
goes to a political party committee rather than a specific candidate (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2010). To make up for the lost funding caused by limits on soft money, the 
contribution limits on hard money per individual were raised. Additionally, the Act 
placed limits on the electioneering communications that included a federal candidate’s 
name or image paid for by corporations, nonprofits, and labor unions (Cornell Law 
School). However, these provisions of the BCRA proved controversial, on the grounds 
that they infringed upon First Amendment rights. These amendments in particular, and 
the controversy that surrounded them resurfaced in the Citizens United case.  
      The Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) and Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(2002) are the foundation for campaign finance legislation in America. These pieces of 
legislation were not enacted on a whim, but they were carefully planned laws enacted to 
address a very real concern, corruption (and the appearance of corruption) in American 
elections. This is why campaign finance matters, to remain a democracy, it is necessary 
to have “clean” elections. Corrupted elections taint the whole system. Studying campaign 
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finance matters because it helps us determine whether these type of laws are working, 
where there are loopholes that can be exploited, and if the laws go too far and 
unjustifiably infringe on First Amendment rights.  
     Within the panoply of U.S. campaign finance court cases, Citizens United stands out, 
because it opened the floodgates for larger sums of money than ever before to enter the 
American political system in the form of independent expenditures. For decades the 
Supreme Court had given the federal government broad discretion to enact campaign 
finance reform legislation that regulated individual contributions to candidates and 
political campaigns to prevent corruption and the appearance of corrupt. However, the 
Supreme Court did not give the federal government broad discretion to enact campaign 
finance reform legislation to regulate independent expenditures, because the Court had 
held that limitations on those violated the First Amendment. Citizens United matters 
because it severely limited the federal government's ability to regulate independent 
expenditures, the result was a rapid proliferation of Super PACs.  
     This investigate the impact of the Citizens United decision on electoral outcomes in 
U.S. House of Representatives races. In political races, having more financial support is 
an advantage, and the candidate with more financial support often wins. In this thesis, I 
investigate how the Citizens United decision may or may not have increased that 
advantage. By analyzing data to compare traditional PAC to Super PAC support, I try to 
determine the success of Super PACs as a means for channeling money into the 
American political system. The success of Super PACs compared to traditional PACs 
shows an aspect of why the Citizens United decision is such a significant decision among 
previous campaign finance Supreme Court decisions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     Supreme Court cases are remembered not only for the specific changes they make to 
the  
U.S. legal code, but also for how the effects of those changes impact the country overall. 
There is substantial literature on the topic of Citizens United and its impact on campaign 
finance, addressing the issue from many different angles. This literature review starts 
with a review of the major campaign finance court cases throughout U.S. history. The 
rest is divided into six sections based on common themes I found in the available 
literature on campaign finance. The six sections are: Citizens United: Citizens United’s 
place among other Supreme Court campaign finance decisions, Citizens United is a threat 
to democracy, Citizens United is a victory for free speech, Citizens United only had a 
minimal impact, Citizens United and congressional races, Citizens United and the role of 
incumbents. 
Case Review  
     Many significant Supreme Court cases dealt with campaign finance throughout U.S. 
history before Citizens United. Herein is a concise explanation of five campaign finance 
Court cases that are important to understanding the impact (in terms of changes to 
campaign finance law) of Citizens United, followed by a more detailed explanation of the 
Citizens United case and the Supreme Court's decision. These five campaign finance 
court cases that are important to understanding the changes the Citizens United decision 
made to U.S. campaign finance law are: Buckley v. Valeo (1976); Austin v. Michigan 
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Chamber of Commerce (1990); McConnell v. FEC (2003); Wisconsin Right to Life v. 
FEC (2007); and SpeechNow.org v. FEC. 
     The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was enacted as an attempt to weed out 
campaign corruption. The Act (and its 1974 amendments which were enacted in the wake 
of the Watergate scandal) placed limits on: campaign contributions from individuals and 
PACs, expenditures by candidates from their own personal funds, and independent 
expenditures (ilsr.org, 2008). A group of individuals that included a senator, a 
presidential candidate, and members of the ACLU sued, arguing that the amendments to 
FECA were unconstitutional on the grounds that they violated the First Amendment's 
freedom of speech and association clause. The case (Buckley v. Valeo) eventually reached 
the Supreme Court. The Court held that the limits on individual and committee donations 
to candidates were constitutional. However, limits on candidates spending their own 
money on their campaign, limits on independent expenditures, and limits on total 
campaign spending were unconstitutional (oyez.org). Buckley v. Valeo is a landmark 
Supreme Court case regarding campaign finance because of the Court's ruling that the 
government cannot put limits on independent expenditures, (spending money on behalf of 
a candidate is considered free speech protected by the First Amendment), which has 
resulted in the proliferation of political action committees.  
     The second campaign finance Court case of importance is Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce (1990). The Michigan Campaign Finance Act of 1979 barred 
corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures supporting 
or opposing political candidates. The Michigan Chamber of commerce sued, arguing that 
the MCFA violated its First Amendment rights (oyez.org). The case eventually reached 
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the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled that the Act did not violate First Amendment 
rights. The Court held that while the Act did place burdens on the Chamber of Commerce 
and other corporations, the burdens were constitutionally justified because 1) the state of 
Michigan had a compelling interest to maintain electoral integrity and 2) the Act was 
narrowly tailored and implemented to achieve that goal (Katz & Vile, 2017). Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce became the foundation for state and federal campaign 
finance regulations; however, it was overturned by the Citizens United decision in 2010.  
     The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) placed limits on soft money being used 
by political party committees for advertising, and it placed limits on the electioneering 
communications that included a federal candidate’s name or image, that were paid for by 
corporations, nonprofits, and labor unions. Numerous lawsuits were filed again the 
BCRA, and the suits were combined into one case named McConnell v. FEC (2003). The 
lawsuits claimed that the Act’s limits on soft money and regulations of source, content, 
and timing of political advertising violated the First Amendment (oyez.org). The Court 
held that the government's legitimate interest to prevent corruption, and the appearance of 
corruption of the electoral process by large financial contributions, allowed the federal 
government to place limits on soft money and electioneering communications. The Court 
therefore upheld the constitutionality of the contested provisions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (2002) (O’Neill). 
     In 2004, a nonprofit political advocacy organization named Wisconsin Right to Life 
sued the Federal Election commission, claiming that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act (2002) provision that barred corporate funds from being used on political 
advertisements within 60 days of an election was unconstitutional, because Wisconsin 
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Right to Life’s ads did not endorse or oppose a candidate (oyez.org). In its decisions for 
the case Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2007) the Supreme Court held that the BCRA 
provision, which barred corporate funds from being used on political advertisements 
within 60 days of the election, was unconstitutional as applied to issue ads like Wisconsin 
Right to Life’s. The majority maintained that there was a significant difference between 
issue ads and express political advocacy, defining express political advocacy as an appeal 
to vote for or against a specific candidate, while everything else falls under issue ads 
(campaignlegal.org, 2015). The Court held that the government has a compelling state 
interest to regulate the latter but not the former.  The decision in Wisconsin Right to Life 
v. FEC (2007) is considered to have virtually overturned sections of the McConnell v. 
FEC (2003) decision. In McConnell v. FEC (2003), the Supreme Court upheld section 
203 of the BCRA against a suit, but in Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2007), the Court 
held that WRTL’s ad was not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Therefore, it 
did not fall under the jurisdiction of the BCRA. This created a loophole which bypassed 
the McConnell v. FEC (2003) decision. 
     SpeechNow.org v. FEC did not reach the Supreme Court, but it is still a very 
important piece of campaign finance court case history. In 2008, SpeechNow.org (a 527 
organization) filed a challenge to the sections of the FECA that placed contribution limits 
and disclosure requirements as applied to political committees that make only 
independent expenditures in elections (campaignlegal.org, 2015). SpeechNow.org argued 
that the contribution limits in the Act unconstitutionally violated the freedom of speech 
clause of the First Amendment, and that the disclosure requirements were 
unconstitutionally burdensome (fec.gov). In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
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District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the contribution limits were unconstitutional as 
applied to individuals’ contributions to SpeechNow.org, but the Court ruled that the 
disclosure requirements were constitutional as applied to SpeechNow.org (fec.gov). 
Speechnow.org v. FEC forever remains in the shadow of Citizens United v. FEC, but the 
two cases are significantly related. Citizens United dealt with the campaign finance 
spending, while Speech Now.org dealt with the other side of the coin, raising campaign 
funds.  
     In 2010, the U.S. court system heard another challenge to major sections of U.S. 
campaign finance law. The Citizens United organization sued the FEC arguing that 
sections of the BCRA infringed upon their First Amendment rights. Citizens United v. 
FEC would eventually become one of the most famous (or infamous) Supreme Court 
cases of the 21st century. The plaintiff in the case was a politically conservative 501 (c) 4 
nonprofit organization named Citizens United. In 2008 the organization released a 
documentary titled Hillary: The Movie. The organization planned to release the film to 
video-on-demand services to cable TV subscribers thirty days before the start of the 2008 
Democratic presidential primary election, and to advertise the film in TV commercials. 
However, the BCRA had expanded the scope of the FECA’s (section 441b) ban on 
corporate and union contributions in connection with political elections to include 
electioneering communications, paid for with general treasury funds, and speech that 
expressly advocates for or against a candidate. Section 203 of the BCRA defined 
electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that 
refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and is made within 60 days 
before a general election or 30 days before a primary election” (Duignan, 2019, p.2).  
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     The BCRA also expanded disclosure and disclaimer requirements. Section 311 of the 
BCRA states “televised electioneering communications funded by anyone other than a 
candidate for office must include a clear, readable disclaimer displayed on the screen for 
at least four seconds. The disclaimer must identify the person or organization responsible 
for the advertisement, that person or organization's address or website, and a statement 
that the advertisement “is not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee” 
(Sullivan, 2010, p.2). To preempt the imposition of a penalty by the FEC, Citizens United 
sought an injunction against the FEC in the the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to prevent the application of BCRA against its film Hillary: The 
Movie (oyez.org).  
     In its case for an injunction, Citizens United argued that section 203 of the BCRA 
violates the First Amendment on its face when applied to Hillary: The Movie, because the 
film did not constitute express advocacy for or against a candidate. The organization also 
argued that section 311 (the donor disclosure section) was unconstitutional as applied to 
Hillary: The Movie. The District Court denied the injunction, holding that Hillary: the 
Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore section 203 had 
not been unconstitutionally applied. After the District Court denied the injunction, the 
Citizens United organization appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted 
a writ of certiorari and heard arguments in the case in March 2009 (campaignlegal.org, 
2015).  
     The Supreme Court decided that it could not resolve the as applied challenge from 
Citizens United, without setting a negative precedent for political speech. Instead, the 
Court broadened the argument from Citizens United (which was quite narrow because it 
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only focused specifically on Hillary: The Movie). This meant revisiting the Court’s 
decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and sections of McConnell v. 
FEC. The Court therefore, considered a facial challenge to sections 203 and 441b, and 
applied strict scrutiny. This meant the government had to show that the sections in 
question served a compelling interest and were narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 
     In January 2010 the Supreme Court announced its decision, holding that the First 
Amendment allows corporations, non-profits, and labor unions to provide independent 
expenditures to promote or attack political candidates, without government restrictions. 
This decision overruled the Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce decision, and 
overruled sections of the McConnell v. FEC decision. The Court held that the decision in 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce interfered with the open marketplace of ideas 
which is protected by the First Amendment. Since the majority believed that Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce was incorrectly decided, it was not persuaded by either 
of the government’s arguments, anti-corruption and shareholder protection.  
     However, the Court ruled that the disclosure requirements of the BCRA were 
constitutionally applied to the film, because the government has a legitimate interest to 
provide transparency of funding sources to voters. While disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements may create a slight burden for a speaker, they do not prevent anyone from 
speaking. Additionally, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements for political 
advertising funders, as well as the ban on direct contributions from corporations and 
unions to candidates.  
     In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy said that all political speech is essential to 
democracy, is does not matter if the source is a corporation. “Government may not 
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suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations” (Sullivan, 2010, p.3). Therefore (section 441b) the ban on corporate and 
union contributions in connection with political elections to include electioneering 
communications, paid for with general treasury funds, and speech that expressly 
advocates for or against a candidate, was facially unconstitutional.  
     Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens stated that government regulation of corporate 
involvement in elections is necessary to preserve the integrity of elections. The dissent 
believed that the majority decision would greatly increase the influence of corporations 
over the election process, stating that the ruling “threatens to undermine the integrity of 
elected institutions across the Nation” (Hudson jr., p.3). Stevens argued that the majority 
had blatantly disregarded the precedent of stare decisis, and had used question begging 
and ad hoc arguments in the majority opinion. The result would “undoubtedly cripple the 
ability of ordinary citizens, Congress, and the States to adopt even limited measures to 
protect against corporate domination of the electoral process. Americans may be forgiven 
if they do not feel the Court has advanced the cause of self-government today” (Duignan, 
2019, p.7). 
     The strong views in both the majority opinion and the dissent set the stage for the 
contentious debate over Citizens United among the American public. Public opinion on 
campaign finance, and specifically the Citizens United decision, show the importance of 
the issue to the American public, and therefore why it is an important topic to study. A 
2004 study on public perceptions of corruption and money in politics by Persily and 
Lammie concluded that “We must admit that large shares of the American population 
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distrust their government and believe the campaign finance system is a source of undue 
influence” (Persily & Lammie, p. 174).  
     A recent study by Dowling and Miller found that Americans view more positively a 
candidate who receives a majority of their campaign contributions from individuals rather 
than from interest groups (Dowling & Miller, 2016). An extensive survey by the New 
York Times found that 84% of Americans believe that money has too much influence in 
political campaigns, while 39% believed that the current campaign financing system 
needed fundamental changes and 46% believe that it needs to be completely rebuilt 
(nytimes.com, 2015). Additionally, 54% answered “no” to the question “Do you consider 
money given to political candidates to be a form of free speech protected by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution?” it is important to note that there was some divergence 
along party lines in answers to this question; Republicans tended to agree with the 
question while Democrat tended to disagree (nytimes.com, 2015).  
     These and many other studies show that campaign finance is considered an important 
topic by Americans, there is concern about the current shape of the U.S. campaign 
finance system. Many believe money has an undue influence on American elections. The 
Citizens United decision has added to this concern by opening up a pathway for corporate 
and union money to influence candidates and elections, which make the impacts of the 
Citizens United decision an important topic to study.  
Citizens United’s Place Among Other Supreme Court Campaign Finance Decisions 
     Citizens United is one of many significant Supreme Court cases that dealt with 
campaign finance regulation throughout American history. To better understand the 
effects of Citizens United, it is important to examine what changes it made compared to 
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other Supreme Court campaign finance decisions. Campaign finance deregulation by the 
Supreme Court began with Buckley v. Valeo in 1976 and continues today, most notably 
with Citizens United v. FEC. Each major Supreme Court campaign finance decision is 
integral to understanding the modern U.S. campaign finance system. 
     What stands out about the Citizens United decision compared to previous Supreme 
Court campaign finance decision is the resulting proliferation of Super PACs (Dwyre, 
2015). 
In “The Deregulatory Moment?” Dwyre states, “The Citizens United and SpeechNow 
decisions  
and the FEC rulings to implement them led to the emergence of a new type of campaign 
organization-the independent expenditure-only political committee, or Super PAC” 
(Dwyre, 2015, p.45). A central aspect of campaign finance regulation is contributions 
limits, but Super PACs became a new way to avoid those contribution limits. Former 
FEC chairman Trevor Potter described Super PACs as “the clearest, easiest way to spend 
unlimited funds on an election… pretty much the holy grail that people have been 
looking for” (Dwyre, 2015, p.46). Super PACs are significant for many reasons, 
especially the potential for corruption that is enabled by allowing them to accept 
unlimited contributions. The first major piece of campaign finance regulation (FECA) 
was enacted in 1971 to address campaign corruption.  
     However, the changes in U.S. campaign finance regulation resulting from the Citizens 
United decision go beyond just the removal of the campaign finance restrictions which 
led to the proliferation SuperPACs (Kang, 2012). A debate that began with the Buckley v. 
Valeo decision was radically altered, because Citizens United “removed almost all 
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government regulation of campaign finance beyond transactions directly involving a 
political party or candidate” (Kang, 2012, p.21). The reason the government enacts 
campaign finance laws is to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, and the 
government had successfully used the anti-corruption interest to defend campaign finance 
regulation from legal challenges for decades. However, the Citizens United decision 
narrowed the government's ability to use the anti-corruption interest to defend campaign 
finance regulations that do not involve funds going directly to candidates, i.e. 
independent expenditures (Kang 2012). 
     In the Citizens United decision the Supreme Court narrowed the anti-corruption 
interest. In Buckley v. Valeo the Court held that the corruption interest was not limited to 
quid pro quo. Later decisions accepted an even more expansive definition of corruption 
most notably Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (Abraham, 2010). The majority 
defended this position by arguing “the fact that speakers may have influence over or 
access to elected officials does not mean that such officials are corrupt” (Abraham, 2010, 
p.1090). By shifting the definition of corruption (in the area of campaign finance) to 
strictly quid pro quo (then holding bans on corporate independent expenditures as 
unconstitutional), the Court was therefore rolling back man previous campaign finance 
Supreme Court decisions.  
    Richard White adds, in “What Counts as Corruption” (2013), the Supreme Court's 
decision in the Citizens United case attempted to oversimplify a complex issue that 
America had been dealing with for centuries. “Struggle with corruption in the Gilded Age 
resonates with combating modern financial and political corruption in the United States. 
It is ironic that their [the Court’s] increasingly complex understanding of corruption 
21 
	
should be reduced to Kennedy's primitive forms” (White, 2013, p.1054). Twentieth-
century campaign finance regulations were the culmination of decades of study of 
corruption in American politics. It was deemed reasonable to limit some freedom of 
speech to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption. Yet decades later, some of 
those regulations would be undone by a Supreme Court majority that believed campaign 
finance laws in certain areas were overly burdensome and a solution looking for a 
problem. However, that lack of a problem is arguable because those campaign finance 
regulations had been successful in reducing corruption in the American political system. 
 
Citizens United is a Threat to Democracy 
     Immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 
debate began over the decision and its possible effects. Many people believed that the 
Citizens United decision was a threat to democracy, arguing that it would enable 
corruption which would obstruct the will of the people. Former senator Russ Feingold 
(co-sponsor of the BCRA) derided the Citizens United decision saying that it “gives a 
green light to corporations to unleash their massive coffers on the political system” 
(Kang, 2012, p.14). The decision has led to an influx in “dark money” in politics overall 
(though Super PACs in particular do have to disclose donors) and without a contribution 
cap, singular donors can fund a much larger percentage of a Super PAC’s operations than 
of a PAC’s. In 2006, only two donors gave over one million dollars to an outside group, 
but in 2014 that number jumped to 84 (Maguire, 2015).  
     The argument that the Citizens United decision is a threat to democracy has two parts. 
First, based on electoral outcomes, and second based on the voting behavior of 
politicians. This thesis relates to the first part of the argument, for which I will investigate 
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how House of Representatives candidates who benefited the most from the result of the 
Citizens United decision (through Super PACs, 501 C nonprofits, 527 group funding 
support) are performing in House of Representatives races compared to candidates with 
regular PAC support before the Citizens United decision comparing 2006 results to 2014 
results. 
     An aspect of the concern over the Citizens United decision is that allowing unlimited 
contributions to Super PACs increases the ability of a small subsection of donors to fund 
a substantial percentage of a campaign for or against a candidate. Lioz and Kennedy 
(2012) found that the vast majority of the money flowing to candidates, parties, Super 
PACs, and other outside groups is coming from a tiny number of wealthy donors, either 
individuals or corporations (Lioz & Kennedy, 2012). In 2012, for example, 68% of the 
$828 million raised by Super PACs came from only 1% of Super PAC donors (Maguire, 
2015). This issue of a small number of donors providing a significant chunk of all 
funding has existed to some degree throughout U.S. history. However, with the 
proliferation of Super PACs, which have no contribution limits, this issue has been 
exacerbated.  
     As donors (particularly corporate donors) pour more and more money into supporting 
campaigns in the post-Citizens United era, it is not surprising that they would expect 
some influence in return for the millions they are donating to support campaigns. 
Krumholz (2013) argues that the evidence that corporate donors are looking for influence 
is that they donate to candidates on committees that interest them (Krumholz, 2013). For 
example, the finance, insurance, and real estate sector (the largest private sector 
contributor to federal candidates and campaigns) give most of their donations to 
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candidates, PACs and SuperPACs of candidates who are on the Financial Services 
committee (Krumholz, 2013). This is only one example, but it shows how the unlimited 
corporate donations to support federal candidates can be intended to influence.  
     Evidence shows that corporations support Super PACs that support candidates on 
committees that deal with the sector that corporation is in. (Krumholz, 2013) While the 
Super PACs have no formal communication with candidate campaigns, instead using 
their funds on independent expenditures, there is great concern that Super PACs and 
candidates are not as independent as the Citizens United decision says they are. Kang 
argues that independent expenditures are not as independent (from candidate campaigns) 
as law says that should be. “They are made without formal coordination, but candidates 
and those making the independent expenditures know whom the spending is intended to 
benefit” (Kang, 2012, p.25). This creates a quasi-quid-pro-quo relationship. Since 
contributions to Super PACs can be unlimited, the fear that corruption will manifest in 
this relationship has become a strong concern of many who consider the Citizens United 
decision as a threat to democracy.  
     In “Aligning Campaign Finance Law” Nicholas Stephanopoulos (2015) also writes 
about a link between the policy decisions of politicians and the preferences of their 
donors. Politicians tend to hold more extreme viewpoints in line with donors, rather than 
more centrist viewpoints of the average American. “The ideal points of members of 
Congress have almost exactly the same bimodal distribution as the ideal points of 
individual contributors. They look nothing like the far more centrist distribution of the 
public at large” (Stephanopoulos, 2015, p.1427). This type of link between the views of 
donors and politicians is seen as a cause for concern by many. This type of link could 
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have numerous impacts on American politics and the political system as a whole. In 
particular, in relation to the Citizens United decision, as campaign finance regulations are 
loosened in the name of free speech, the possibility of corruption from this link could 
increase.  
     The concern of corruption is the heart of the argument that the Citizens United 
decision is a threat to democracy. The government can regulate campaign finance to 
prevent corruption, but the Citizens United decision narrowed the definition of corruption 
in regard to campaign finance returning to a Buckley v. Valeo definition. Hasen points out 
that changing the definition of corruption shows that a major aspect of the Citizens 
United debate is over what constitutes corruption in regards to campaign finance (Hasen, 
2011). The definition has been narrowed in the name of free speech, but many are 
concerned that it has been narrowed too much. A narrow definition of corruption can 
force the government to be reactive instead of proactive. As a result the federal 
government will become forced to respond to corruption rather than using its full ability 
to prevent corruption before it occurs.  
     The Citizens United decision in 2010 made it easier for corporations to enter the 
political arena by holding that the First Amendment protects corporate donations to 
political causes. In a democratic government, the elected officials are responsive to the 
will of the electorate. When corporations enter the political arena by funding campaigns 
that support certain candidates and attack others, there is concern that the voices of the 
electorate will be drowned out by the multi-million dollar corporate “war chests.” In 
“Expensive Speech Illegitimate Power” Zakaras (2013) argues that this situation is a 
serious cause for concern.  He states, “Political speech authored by for-profit corporations 
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- including not just political advertising during campaign season, but political lobbying 
year round - is often dangerous to democracy” (Zakaras, 2013, p.526). Clearly, large 
corporate contributions can speak louder than the voices of the electorate. Giving the 
corporate donors significant influence over the representative that “the people” cannot 
match.  
Citizens United is a Victory for Free Speech 
     On the other side of the debate over the Citizens United decision, many argue that the 
decision was an important victory for free speech. Political speech is integral to a 
democracy. Whether it is coming from an individual or a corporation, campaign finance 
regulations that limit the amount that corporations can give to fund political campaigns is 
a restriction on free speech. Supporters of the Citizens United decision contest or 
downplay the possible negative effects of the decision that are promoted by those who 
believe that the Citizens United decision is a threat to democracy. It is important to study 
arguments in favor of the Citizens United decision to learn both sides of the debate over 
the decision and the importance of free speech for all types of sources that fund political 
campaigns. The impact of Super PAC funds on a candidate's chance of winning can show 
how free speech (in terms of campaign funding) impacts the ability of a candidate to 
successfully run a political campaign. Campaign funding helps candidates advertise 
themselves to the public. On the other hand, campaign donation limits could potentially 
burden a candidate’s ability to legitimately run for office, thereby blocking new 
candidates and new ideas from being represented in political races.   
     Many who support the Citizens United decision as a victory for free speech argue that 
the decision is important not only for free speech and campaign finance regulations, but 
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also as a general First Amendment case. In “Citizens United and the Battle for Free 
Speech in America” Simpson (2012) argues that in the twenty-first century, the First 
Amendment came to be viewed as a tool to serve the goals of society rather than 
individuals (Simpson, 2012). However, the Citizens United decision “returns to the 
constitutional principle that the government must protect and not violate freedom of 
speech” (Simpson, 2012, p.15). The Citizens United decision clearly outlines the breadth 
of the First Amendment and shows how severe a situation must be for the government to 
be allowed to limit free speech.  
     In “In Defense of Citizens United: Why Campaign Finance Reform Threatens 
American Democracy” Hubbard and Kane (2013) argue that the Citizens United decision 
was a good decision because it can potentially help break up the duopoly of the two-party 
political system in the U.S. (Hubbard and Kane, 2013). They state that the enactment of 
FECA coincided with a hyper-partisan divergence in Congress, because it gave greater 
control over campaign funds to the political parties. The authors write “The changes in 
campaign finance rules turned American politics into a classic case of monopolistic 
competition, in which the Democrats and Republicans’ partisan duopoly was protected by 
government regulation that diminished innovative policy ideas” (p.127). Hubbard and 
Kane believe that the Citizens United decision allowed new voices to enter politics that 
had been previously locked out by the duopoly held by the Democratic and Republican 
parties. With new voices, American politics will hopefully represent the more diverse 
voices of the American public.          
     Like Hubbard and Kane, Bradley A. Smith (2015) also writes about the importance of 
the Citizens United decision as an avenue to lessen the stranglehold of the two political 
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parties on American politics. While many opposed to the Citizens United decision decry 
the resulting increase in outside spending as a threat to American democracy, Smith 
argues that outside spending by a variety of interest groups is important to bring new 
viewpoints that may be different from major party planks. He says, “Outside spending 
simply means spending not controlled by candidates and political parties — spending by 
the Humane Society, the National Association of Realtors, the Environmental Defense 
Fund, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and similar groups. It is crucial for such citizen 
organizations to speak out about candidates. Political discussion should not be 
monopolized by politicians and political parties” (Smith, 2015, p.2). Citizens United has 
therefore resulted in more speech, bringing new viewpoints, making it a victory for free 
speech. 
Citizens United Only Had a Minimal Impact 
     There are strong arguments on both sides of the debate over whether the Citizens 
United decision has/will positively or negatively impact American democracy, but there 
is also a third group who argue that the Citizens United decision in and of itself has had 
only a minimal impact, because it is one in a long line of campaign finance deregulation 
Supreme Court cases. To those who support this argument, Citizens United is a 
controversial case because campaign finance has become over-politicized. The anti-
democratic corporate takeover of American elections has become a rallying cry for some 
grassroots political movements, as “perceived corporate dominance has spurred a recent 
populist backlash on both the political left and the political right… even if Citizens 
United’s incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless has the feeling of a final straw” 
(Levitt, 2010, p.217). Not surprisingly, there is plenty of literature about the disconnect 
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between perceived changes and actual changes of the Citizens United decision. Much of 
what is seen to be drastic changes to campaign finance law made by the Citizens United 
decision was chipped away at by a number of previous decisions, Wisconsin Right to Life 
v. FEC in particular.   
     The literature about the Citizens United decision having only a minimal impact either 
discusses changes made to the legal code compared to previous campaign finance cases, 
or how those changes have only minimally affected elections so far. For example, In 
“Can Rich Dudes Buy an Election?” Darrell West (2014) points to the fact that in 2012, 
conservative mega donors used Super PACs to take advantage of changes made to 
campaign finance law by the Citizens United decision to spend more money than ever 
before to try to defeat Barack Obama, yet he still won. Obama’s ability to appeal to a 
large swath of the American public and to mobilize those voters proved more effective 
than the millions of dollars spent on TV ads by the Koch brothers, Karl Rove etc. . . . 
Leading West to conclude that “Rich people can’t automatically buy American elections, 
but money has a crucial impact on problem definition and campaign dialogue” (West, 
2014, p.34). While this is only one example of one presidential race it points to the fact 
that elections are much more complex than a handful of donor spending millions of dollar 
to try to influence the outcome. 
      West discusses how the changes made by the Citizens United decision have only 
minimally affected elections so far, using the 2012 presidential election as an example. In 
“The End of Campaign Finance Law” Michael Kang argues that much of the perceived 
changes to American campaign finance law by the Citizens United decision had been 
changed years earlier in a lesser known case, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC. Much of 
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the concern over the Citizens United decision revolves around corporate spending on 
elections, and how that spending would significantly increase as a result of the Citizens 
United decision.  
     However, “the Court had already opened the door for what amounted to corporate 
spending on campaign speech, in the form of so-called “sham issue advocacy,” a few 
years earlier in a much less publicized decisions” (Kang, 2012, p.3). In Wisconsin Right 
to Life v. FEC the Supreme Court narrowed the government's ability to restrict corporate 
spending, allowing corporate spending on a variety of types of ads that support or 
criticize candidates for federal office. In regard to corporate spending on issue ads, the 
only change that the Citizens United decision made was allowing corporations to be more 
explicit in their campaign advocacy (Kang, 2012). 
     Nate Persily, director of the Center for Law and Politics at Columbia Law School has 
a similar view of the Citizens United decision and the changes (or lack thereof) it made to 
U.S. campaign finance law. According to Persily, “Most critics of the decision will 
suggest that the Court, with this decision, opened the floodgates to unlimited corporate 
and union spending in next year’s and subsequent federal elections. The truth is that this 
decision is the latest in a series of decisions (four, to be exact) from the Roberts Court 
knocking down campaign finance laws. The floodgates, such as they are, were opened 
three years ago in a different case, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC” (Marx, 2010, p.3). 
The significance of the Citizens United decision therefore lies in expanding the types of 
advertisements protected by the First Amendment. Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC 
protected ads that praised or criticized a federal candidate, the Citizens United decision 
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protected ads that directly endorsed a candidate or said “do not vote for…” a specific 
candidate.  
Citizens United and Congressional Races 
     Since the question of this thesis focuses on House of Representatives races, it is 
important to study the literature about the Citizens United decision that focuses on how it 
could (or could not) impact Congress both electoral outcomes and the behavior of 
politicians. The Citizens United decision increased the amount of money spent on 
congressional races (Kim, 2016). Studies have found that unlimited campaign 
contribution allows singular donors to fund a larger percentage of a campaign. It has been 
discussed at length whether these funds will impact the ways representatives vote.       
     Besides the data analysis, much of the literature on Citizens United and congressional 
races focuses on specific examples of how the effects of the Citizens United decision 
helped and influenced candidates. In “How Citizens United changed Politics and Shaped 
the Tax Bill” Norden et, al. (2017) use the recent tax bill (The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) as 
an example of donors in the post - Citizens United era strongly influencing policy. When 
asked about the prioritizing of the tax bill, Representative Chris Collins (R-NY) said, 
“My donors are basically saying, ‘Get it done or don’t ever call me again.’” Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s former chief of staff Steven Law said, “[Donors] 
would be mortified if we didn’t live up to what we’ve committed to on tax reform” 
(Norden et, al., 2017, p.2). While on the other side of the equation, conservative donor 
Doug Deason told congressmen “We’re closing the checkbook until you get some things 
done...Get Obamacare repealed and replaced, get tax reform passed…You control the 
Senate. You control the House. You have the presidency. There's no reason you can't get 
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this done. Get it done and we'll open it back up” (Norden et, al., 2017, p.2). Similar to 
how Citizens United allowed corporation funded political ads that more forcefully 
support or condemn a candidate, politicians can be more open, and donors more forceful, 
about the influence donors hold.  
     Norden et al. (2017) theorize that donors and politicians have become much more 
open about this type of behavior since the Citizens United decision, because individual 
donors can now contribute much larger sums of money than before Citizens United by 
using Super PACs. This means that a “handful” of individual donors can now have a 
much greater influence over a candidate/politician because they are able to be a much 
larger percentage of a campaigns advertising. For example, before Citizens United, a 
donor who gave $100,000 or more could represent 5% of all contributions, but now post 
Citizens United a donor can represent 25% of all contributions (Norden et, al., 2017).  
      Another example of Citizens United affecting congressional races is Orrin Hatch's 
2012 reelection campaign. In 2012, Hatch was facing a strong primary challenger, who 
was supported by a Super PAC named FreedomWorks for America. In response to the 
anti-Hatch ads funded by FreedomWorks, the pharmaceutical industry’s main lobbyist 
group Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America gave $750,000 to a 501 
(c) 4 “social welfare non-profit named Freedom Path that mainly supported Hatch in the 
2012 election (Beckel, 2012). Hatch is on the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 
committee, which shows why the pharmaceutical industry supports him so strongly. This 
connection is an example of Krumholz’s argument that the evidence that corporate 
donors are looking for influence is that they give to candidates on committees that 
interest them (Krumholz, 2013).  
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     In 2005 Brad Alexander published a study titled “Good Money and Bad Money: Do 
Funding Sources Affect Electoral Outcomes?” Since this study is from 2005, it is not 
about Super PACs, but Alexander does write at length about the impacts traditional PACs 
have on electoral outcomes. Alexander found that traditional PAC support had a 
significant impact on a candidate's chances of winning, “the higher the percentage of 
donations a candidate accepts from PACs, the more likely they are to win” (Alexander, 
2005, p.355). While traditional PACS are different than Super PACs, they are the 
precursors to Super PACs. Super PACs can raise unlimited sums and use that money on 
independent expenditures to strengthen a candidate's chance of winning even more, 
whether in a reelection or as a challenger. 
Citizens United and the Role of Incumbents 
     The incumbency advantage is the advantage that a candidate who is the current holder 
of a seat has over the challenger. The incumbency advantage exists because incumbents 
have better name recognition, more experienced campaign officials, previous campaign 
outreach, and access to more financial resources (Landsman, 2017). The incumbency 
advantage is relevant to this thesis because it can be difficult to distinguish between the 
influence of campaign funds (as a result of a change in campaign finance regulations) and 
the power of incumbency. Incumbency is an issue that I must be aware of when analyzing 
data because the incumbency advantage can easily be conflated with the effects of 
additional campaign funds as a result of Citizens United.  
     There are many ways in which the incumbency advantage and the changes brought 
about by Citizens United are linked. Heberlig & Larson (2012) write about the 
relationship between independent expenditures and the success of incumbents in “Parties, 
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Incumbents, and Campaign Finance in American Elections” from 2012. With the Citizens 
United decision expanding the amount of independent expenditures for express advocacy, 
donors can more directly help candidates. Instead of giving money to party committees 
which then decide how to use the money and what candidate to spend it on, donors can 
give the money to Super PACs and 501Cs to directly impact the candidate they support. 
“With a new spending option open to them, corporations could potentially shift their 
political spending towards express advocacy rather than making PAC contributions to 
incumbents (who can then redistribute those funds to the parties)” (Heberlig & Larson, 
2012, p.57). This shift could allow more money to go directly to incumbents, thus 
increasing their advantage, part of the financial resources aspect of the incumbency 
advantage. While incumbents benefit from this change in campaign finance law, it is still 
important to consider that some of the support is because of the preexisting incumbency 
advantage.  
     In a second piece by Heberlig and Larson titled, “U.S. House Incumbent Fundraising 
and Spending in a Post-Citizens United and Post-McCutcheon World” (2014), they 
investigate the fundraising behavior of incumbents since the Citizens United decision. 
Heberlig and Larson found that incumbents are concerned that Super PACs will help 
challengers to unseat them, causing incumbents to increasing their fundraising efforts 
(Heberlig and Larson, 2014). They write “The Supreme Court's rulings in Citizens United 
and SpeechNow.org have the potential to increase electoral uncertainty for incumbents by 
making it easier for unregulated groups to finance a campaign to defeat them. The threat 
of such a campaign would motivate House members to raise more campaign money to 
protect themselves” (Heberlig & Larson, 2014, p.2). Increasing fundraising efforts would 
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drive the cost of running a congressional race even higher than it already is, which would 
mean more money in politics in general. Since house incumbents already have incredibly 
high reelection rates, the additional outside spending from Super PACs could have a 
serious impact either way, by solidifying the reflection opportunities of incumbents or 
helping challengers win longshot campaigns.  
     In “Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents” Scott 
Ashworth (2006) also discusses the effects of the incumbency advantage combined with 
easier access and influence over candidates. Loosening campaign finance regulation 
means that donors can now fund a larger percentage of a campaign (Norden et, al., 2017). 
Donors expect influence in return when the candidate wins, but the candidate must win 
for the donor to gain influence, which “leads them to demand more favors from 
candidates with less chance of winning, so incumbents have advantage in fundraising” 
(Ashworth, 2006, p.64). When combined with the incumbency advantage, challengers 
start at an even greater disadvantage making races less competitive. Therefore, the 
weakened campaign finance regulations strengthen the incumbency advantage, in turn 
making electoral outcomes a combination of the two, general incumbency advantage and 
Super PAC funding of campaigns.  
     Another important aspect of incumbency is that incumbents do not always need to 
spend large sums of money to win, due to the many aspects of the incumbency 
advantage. In “Measuring Campaign Spending Effects in U.S. House Elections” Gary 
Jacobson (2006) finds that “heavy spending by incumbents is a sign of electoral 
weakness, while heavy spending by challengers is a sign of electoral strength” (Jacobson, 
2006, p.204). This also applies to other sort of funding on behalf of candidates PACs, 
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Super PACs, 501Cs, a donor(s) often will not see a need to spend large sums on a 
particular candidate if that candidate does not face a serious challenge (Jacobson, 2006). 
Since this thesis compares PAC support to Super PAC and 501 (c) support, and looking 
at electoral outcomes, this is an important factor to consider since the incumbency 
advantage helps candidates aside from outside funding.   
     The literature on Citizens United and its impact on campaign finance is substantial. I 
have chosen a number of pieces for my literature from the six common themes I found 
throughout the literature. The literature shows how important many believe the Citizens 
United case to be. It is viewed both positively and negatively with strong arguments on 
all sides. It has now been close to nine years since the decision, with congressional 
elections every two years that means five elections since the decision was announced and 
the changes to American campaign finance law were made. For my research, I used 
campaign finance data for the 2006 and 2014 U.S. House of Representatives elections. I 
compared the success of candidates with more PAC support (in individual races) to the 
success of candidates with more Super PAC support (in individual races). This 
comparison will determine if the rise of Super PACs resulting from the Citizens United 
decision has significantly impacted electoral outcomes compared to PACs, which were 
key before the Citizens United decision and the subsequent proliferation of Super PACs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
     In this thesis I investigated the impact of the Citizens United decision on electoral 
outcomes in U.S. House of Representatives races, by comparing the success of candidates 
with the most PAC support (in respective races) to the success of candidates with the 
most outside spending support (Super PACs, 501 c nonprofit organizations, and 527 
groups) in the 2006 and 2014 election cycles. The campaign finance data analyzed are 
from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Some of the data I accessed by-way-of the 
Center for Responsive Politics, which had data organized in ways that were easier to 
navigate. The FEC is an independent regulatory agency that enforces campaign finance 
laws in the U.S. for federal elections. Federal campaign finance law has three distinct 
areas: disclosure of funds raised and spent, restrictions on contributions and expenditures, 
public financing of presidential campaigns (fec.gov). Data that candidates, party 
committees, PACs, Super PACs et al. must disclose are sent to the FEC where they are 
compiled and accessible to the public. 
          The data I analyzed in this thesis come from the 2006 and 2014 U.S. House of 
Representatives election cycles. In the data analysis, I compared the success of House 
candidates in 2006 who had the most traditional PAC support in their respective races, to 
the success of House candidates in 2014 who had the most outside spending (Super PAC, 
501 c, 527 group) support in their respective races. I investigated whether the candidate 
with the most outside spending (Super PAC, 501 c, 527 group) support in respective 
races in 2014, won or lost more or less often than the candidates with the most traditional 
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PAC support in respective races in 2006. I chose 2006 and 2014 for my comparison 
because they are the two full election cycles closest before and after the Citizens United 
decision without a presidential race. I decided to not analyze data from election cycles 
with a presidential race (2008 and 2012), because presidential elections can influence the 
congressional campaign finance situation, and I am particularly interested in U.S. House 
races. Since I am investigating the impact of the Citizens United decision on House of 
Representatives electoral outcomes, comparing 2006 and 2014 provides a more 
immediate impact, because those are the two election cycles closest before and after the 
Citizens United decision without a presidential race.   
     For 2014, I used outside spending data for U.S. House of Representatives candidates. 
Outside spending includes Super PACs, 501 c nonprofit organizations, and 527 groups. 
The outside spending takes the form of independent expenditures, electioneering 
communications, and communication costs (opensecrets.org). Super PACs are 
organizations that can raise an unlimited amount of money from corporations, unions, 
non profits, and individuals, to spend on elections advocating for or against candidates; 
however, they cannot donate directly to a campaign or work with a campaign.  501 (c) 
groups are tax-exempt non-profit organizations that can engage in varying degrees of 
political activity based on the type, they can receive unlimited donations from 
corporations, or individuals, and do not have to disclose the source of their funding. 527 
groups are organizations whose purpose is to influence political issues, candidate 
elections, policy debates, or political appointments, they can raise unlimited amounts of 
money from corporations, unions, and individuals, but they must disclose their 
contributors. After the first round of data analysis my committee suggested that I also 
38 
	
analyze the three categories for PAC support in 2014 to see if this was a significant 
change between 2006 and 2014.  
     For 2006, I used traditional PAC spending for U.S. House candidates. Traditional 
PACs (Political Action Committees) are political organizations that raise money and then 
give that money directly to candidates and party committees, or spend it on independent 
expenditures. PACs often represent business, labor, or ideological interests. There are 
limits on how much money a PAC can give to candidate committees, national party 
committees, other PACs, and on how much money they can receive from individuals, 
party committees, and other PACs (opensecrets.org). I chose to compare traditional PACs 
to Super PACs, because the former are the precursor to Super PACs, and Super PACs 
proliferated as a direct result of the Citizens United decision.  
     There are 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, and each is up for election 
every two years. However, many of the races are not considered competitive, and there 
are even some races where a candidate runs unopposed. In races that are not competitive, 
it is unlikely that much money from traditional PACs, Super PACs, 501c, 527 groups will 
be involved. Since my thesis focuses on spending from these organizations, it would not 
make sense to analyze every race. Therefore, the data that I analyze are divided into three 
categories: open seat races, competitive races, and races with a 7:1 and below spending 
ratio between the two highest spending candidates. The competitive races are from the 
Sabato Center for Politics at the University of Virginia. Each election cycle the Sabato 
Center uses their political forecasting model to indicate certain races as competitive. 
Though the races in the competitive seat category come from the Sabato Center, the 
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campaign finance data that I analyze for each category comes from the Center for 
Responsive Politics (outside spending) and FEC website (traditional PAC spending).  
     I chose open seats as the first category for races to analyze because open seat races 
tend to have more money spent on them. Incumbency provides a significant advantage so 
when there are no incumbents the races tend to be more competitive. Political parties 
often see open seats as an opportunity to flip a seat. Open seats tend to be considered 
more competitive than races with an incumbent, therefore, it is more likely that large 
sums of money will be spent on the race by outside sources. Since my thesis focuses on 
outside spending and potential changes from traditional PACs to Super PACs, 501c s, 
and 527 groups, open seat races are a relevant category. In the open seat category there 
were 31 races in 2006, and 42 races in 2014. 
     I chose competitive seats as the second category, because that cuts right to the core of 
the types of races relevant to my analysis. The most competitive races are most likely to 
have large sums of outside money spent on them. Having a category labeled competitive 
directly cuts out all races considered noncompetitive and therefore unlikely to have much 
outside spending, making them nearly irrelevant to my analysis. There are many 
definitions for a competitive House race, but I chose to analyze the races considered 
competitive by the Sabato Center, because they produced a list of House races they 
considered competitive for both 2006 and 2014. The Sabato Center for Politics at the 
University of Virginia studies and promotes civic engagement and political participation 
(centerforpolitics.org). The Sabato Center’s ratings system is based on a number of 
factors that include: electoral history, polling, candidate quality, modeling, reporting. In 
the competitive seat category, there were 61 races in 2006, and 36 races in 2014.  
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     The third category is races with a 7:1 and below spending ratio. This category is much 
larger than the first two categories, and there is some overlap with the first two 
categories. The Center for Responsive Politics gives each House race a spending ratio 
from 1:1 to 10:1, comparing the winner to the second-highest vote getter. My advisor and 
I decided on a 7:1 limit, because that would provide a substantial amount of races to 
analyze (many more than the first two categories), while removing the most lopsided 
races. We decided on using a ratio as the parameter instead of races in which the top two 
vote getters spent above a certain dollar amount, because a ratio gives a better picture of 
the difference in spending of the top two vote getters. It is possible that there are races 
where neither candidate spent a large amount of money and the race was very 
competitive. This would be a situation where outside spending could have a significant 
impact. In the 7:1 and below spending ratio category, there were 172 races in 2006, and 
126 races in 2014.  
     A potential issue to be aware of when analyzing the data and writing the data analysis 
chapter is that the incumbency advantage can easily be conflated with the effects of 
additional funds, in this case, the result of the Citizens United decision. Politicians 
running for reelection are known to have over their challengers, it is called the 
incumbency advantage. The incumbency advantage exists because incumbents have 
better name recognition, more experienced campaign officials, previous campaign 
outreach, and access to more financial resources (landsman, 2017). The “access to more 
financial resources” aspect of the incumbency advantage is especially relevant to my 
thesis topic. Financial support is often a key to victory in U.S. House races, though 
incumbency is also, and the two often go hand-in-hand. After the first round of data 
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analysis, my committee suggested that I analyze the data for the 3:1 and below spending 
ratio to see if there was a significant difference from the 7:1 and below spending ratio.  
     By dividing the data into three categories, I studied the impact of the changes caused 
by the Citizens United decision in three different situations. Since one of the categories is 
open seats there would be no incumbent in those races. Therefore, I could compare the 
success of the candidates with the most Super PAC support (and the change from 
traditional PAC to Super PAC from 2006 to 2014) in the open seat races category to the 
other categories to see if a lack of an incumbent produces a significant difference. 
     While analyzing the data, I noticed that often when the candidate with less PAC 
support or outside spending support won a race, the incumbent lost. I was curious about a 
possible connection, so I determined the percentage of races in which the incumbent 
political party (because some races were open seats) retained the seat.  I did this for all 
categories in 2006 and 2014, and for the competitive races in 2016 and 2018.  
     The focus of this thesis is comparing 2006 and 2014, however, in the second round of 
data analysis, I analyzed some data from 2016 and 2018. My committee suggested that I 
analyze competitive races from 2016 and 2018, to investigate whether or not the changes 
I found in the 2014 data continued in 2016 and 2018. For both 2016 and 2018, I analyzed 
competitive races, to determine what percentage of the races the candidate with more 
outside support won. I only analyzed the competitive races in 2016 and 2018, because 
outside spending appeared to have a more significant impact on competitive races than 
the other categories.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
     This thesis investigates the impact of the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision on 
the electoral outcomes of U.S. House of Representatives races. The thesis question is, in 
House of Representatives races since the Citizens United decision, are the candidates 
with the most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofit, and 527 group support (in individual races) 
winning more often than the candidates with the most traditional PAC funding in House 
of Representatives races before the Citizens United decision, comparing 2006 to 2014? 
The data analysis chapter is divided into five sections: Introduction, Results, Discussion, 
Hypotheses, Limitations. 
 Introduction 
     The data that I analyzed are campaign finance data from the FEC, some of which I 
accessed by-way-of the Center for Responsive Politics. I used total PAC support for 
individual House of Representatives candidates for 2006 and 2014, total outside support 
for individual House of Representatives candidates for 2014, 2016, and 2018, and official 
election results reports from the FEC to determine the incumbent party winning 
percentage in 2006, 2014, 2016, and 2018. The races are divided into three categories 
(with some overlap): open seats, competitive seats, and spending ratio (as described in 
my methodology chapter). 
     I analyzed the data to address three questions: In what percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more PAC support win? (2006 and 2014). In what percentage of the races 
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did the candidate with more outside support win? (2014, 2016, 2018). In what percentage 
of the races did the incumbent party retain the seat? (2006, 2014, 2016, 2018).  
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more PAC support win? 
     Since this thesis investigates the possible impacts of outside spending (Super PACs, 
527s, 501 (c) s) on House of Representatives races, I needed data from before the 
decision to compare the outside spending post Citizens United to. Traditional PACs are 
the precursor to Super PACs, therefore, they are the best political organization to 
compare Super PACs to. Comparing the results from outside spending post Citizens 
United to traditional PAC spending pre Citizens United was the best way to complete a 
before and after comparison. This comparison allows me to investigate how the change 
from traditional PACs to Super PACs has impacted electoral outcomes by increasing, 
decreasing, or keeping the same, the winning percentages for candidates with the most of 
that type of support in individual races.  
     I also analyzed PAC support for 2014 to compare it with 2006 to see determine if 
there was a significant change. While Super PACs were created and then proceeded to 
proliferate in the wake of the Citizens United decision, traditional PACs still exist, but 
they are no longer the “center of attention” in the campaign finance world. I determined 
the winning percentage of the candidates with more PAC support for 2014 and compared 
that to 2006 to investigate how the creation and proliferation of Super PACs may or may 
not have impacted the use and effectiveness of traditional PACs.  
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more outside support win? 
     Since I am interested in the impacts of the Citizens United decision on electoral 
outcomes, I decided upon the above question. Super PACs were created and then 
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proceeded to proliferate in the wake of the Citizens United decision, and Super PACs 
make up a significant percentage of the total outside spending. Therefore, the above 
question cuts directly to the impact of outside spending (especially Super PACs) on 
electoral outcomes. Looking at the winning percentages of candidates with more outside 
spending support provides an overview of the significant role outside spending can play 
in races and how it compares to traditional PAC support (the primary option before the 
Citizens United decision). While I started with only 2014, upon suggestion by the thesis 
committee, I also analyzed the outside spending data to answer the question for 2016 and 
2018, to see if the results were similar.  
What percentage of the races did the incumbent party retain the seat? 
     This was not a question I initially planned to address in my data analysis. However, as 
I was analyzing the data, I became curious about the relationship between the winning 
percentage of candidates with more PAC and outside spending support, and the winning 
percentage of the incumbent party (I chose incumbent party rather than just incumbent 
because one category of data is open seats therefore there are no incumbents in this 
category). I noticed that the incumbent party often retained the seat, whether or not they 
had more PAC or outside spending support. But when the challenger won a seat, they 
would almost always have more PAC or outside spending support. Therefore, I decided 
to incorporate the above question into my data analysis as a way to see if there was a 
direct relationship.  
Results 
     My data results made a 9x4 table with years and questions along the horizontal axis 
and categories along the vertical axis. I have divided that table by category, question, and 
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year, creating a series of smaller tables which are listed below. First is open seats; second 
is competitive seats; and third is based on spending ratio, which is divided into two 
groups - 7:1 and below spending ratio and 3:1 and below spending ratio.  
 
Open Seats  
Table 2 
Question 1 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with 
more PAC support win?  
83.8% 87.8%   
 
Table 3 
Question 2 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more 
outside support win?  
 68.3% 75% 80% 
 
Table 4 
Question 3 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the incumbent party 
retain the seat?  
80% 85.7% 90% 74% 
 
Competitive Seats  
 
Table 5 
Question 1 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more 
PAC support win? 
60.6% 55%   
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Table 6 
Question 2 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with 
more outside support win?  
 63.8% 55% 69.4% 
 
Table 7 
Question 3  2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the incumbent party 
retain the seat?  
55.7% 55% 74% 47.2% 
 
Spending Ratio 
7:1 and below  
 
Table 8 
 
Question 1 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with 
more PAC support win? 
84.3% 87.8%   
 
Table 9 
Question 2 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with 
more outside support win?  
 62.7% 58.9% * 
 
Table 10 
Question 3  2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the incumbent party 
retain the seat?  
83.1% 85.7% 88.4% * 
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Spending Ratio 
3:1 and below 
 
Table 11 
 
Question 1 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with 
more PAC support win? 
77.8% 83.8%   
 
Table 12 
Question 2 2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more 
outside support win?  
 64% 55.4% * 
 
Table 13 
Question 3  2006 2014 2016 2018 
What percentage of the races did the incumbent party 
retain the seat?  
76% 84.8% 85.1% * 
 
Discussion 
     My thesis question is, in House of Representatives races since the Citizens United 
decision, are the candidates with the most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 groups 
support (in individual races) winning more often than the candidates with the most 
traditional PAC funding in House of Representatives races before the Citizens United 
decision, comparing 2006 to 2014? I started by comparing PAC support in 2006 to 
outside spending support in 2014.  
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Table 14 
 2006 2014 
 What percentage of the races did 
the candidate with more PAC 
support win? 
 
What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more outside support 
win? 
 
Open Seats 83.8% 68.3% 
Competitive 60.6% 63.8% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
84.3% 62.7% 
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
77.8% 64% 
 
     I found that for open seats there was a 15.5 percentage point decrease, for competitive 
seats there was a 3.2 percentage point increase, and for spending ratio 7:1 and below 
there was a 21.6 percentage point decrease and 3:1 and below there was a 13.8 
percentage point decrease. The results show outside support being less aligned than PAC 
support in 2006 with electoral winners in House of Representatives for races in the open 
seat and spending ratio categories. However, competitive seat winners were more aligned 
with the candidate with more outside support (2014) than PAC support (2006). I 
immediately noticed that in the open seat and spending ratio categories there was a 
greater than ten percentage point decrease while there was an increase in the competitive 
seat category. This trend appeared in many of the comparisons. I believe this is because 
the competitive seat races are all truly competitive, while the races in the open seat and 
spending ratio categories have significantly varying degrees of competitiveness.  
      I chose open seats as a category for my data analysis because I believed that open seat 
races tended to be more competitive than races with an incumbent. I soon learned that 
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many open seats are not competitive in any way, and in many the incumbent party easily 
retains the seat, because in reality, many of the open seat races were districts where one 
party had an overwhelming enrollment advantage over the other party. One aspect of the 
results of this comparison that confirmed my expectations was that the percentages for 
the 3:1 and below spending ratio group were less than the percentages for the 7:1 and 
below spending ratio group. This trend continued throughout the data analysis, I had 
expected it to be this way because the greater the variation in spending ratios, the less 
competitive (on the whole) I expected races to be. 
     Comparing PAC support in 2006 to outside spending support in 2014 stands out 
because it compares different questions in different years. However, the rest of the 
comparisons are either: between years (but the same question), between the categories, or 
different questions but within the same year. After completing the comparison of PAC 
support in 2006 to outside spending support in 2014, my thesis committee suggested that 
I compare PAC support in 2006 to PAC support in 2014 to see if there was a significant 
change in the effectiveness of PAC support after the creation and proliferation of Super 
PACs. 
Table 15 
 
 2006 2014 
 What percentage of the races did 
the candidate with more PAC 
support win? 
What percentage of the races did 
the candidate with more PAC 
support win? 
Open Seats 83.8% 87.8% 
Competitive Seats 60.6% 55% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
84.3% 87.8% 
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3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
77.8% 83.% 
 
     The results show a slight percentage increase from 2006 to 2014 in open seat races 
and spending ratio races; however, there is a percentage decrease for competitive seats. 
This means that PAC support became slightly closer aligned with winning candidates in 
2014 than 2006 in open seat races and spending ratio races, but less aligned in 
competitive seat races. I believe this result is because outside spending (particularly 
Super PACs) became the primary vehicle for independent expenditures for truly 
competitive races. Therefore, the races that were left with lots of traditional PAC support 
were most likely not at all competitive, leading to an increase in the success of candidates 
with more PAC support. The winning percentage of candidate with more PAC support in 
(truly) competitive races in 2014 decreased because the successful candidates in those 
races were getting significant outside spending support. Again, the percentage 
increase/decrease for competitive seats was the opposite of the other categories. My 
speculation as to why that is the case is that the races in the competitive seats category 
were all truly competitive, while the other categories have a mixture of races from very 
competitive to not competitive at all.  
     Table 15 is important because it looks at the potential changes in the alignment of 
PAC support with winning candidates once Super PACs became an option for spending 
large sums of money on political campaigns. Studying the changes in the percentage of 
the races where the candidate with more PAC support won, gives a better understanding 
of what types of races/candidates PAC support is going to post-Citizens United.  The 
results show that PAC support is less aligned with winning candidates in truly 
competitive races, possibly meaning that  
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outside support is becoming the primary way to influence truly competitive races. 
 
Table 16 
 2014 2014 
 What percentage of the races did 
the candidate with more PAC 
support win? 
What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more outside support 
win? 
 
Open Seats 87.8% 68.3% 
Competitive Seats 55% 63.8% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
87.8% 62.7% 
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
83.8% 64% 
 
     The table 16 results show a much greater winning percentage for candidate with more 
PAC support than outside support in the open seats category and both spending ratio 
categories. However for competitive seats, the candidates with more outside support had 
a greater winning percentage than the candidates with more PAC support. I would 
speculate that the reason for this is because traditional PAC support is going towards 
races that are less competitive (the open seats and spending ratio categories included 
races that greatly vary in competitiveness). This results in a very high winning percentage 
for candidates with more PAC support. While outside spending is being used by 
organizations to support truly competitive rates because there are fewer regulations of 
outside spending than traditional PACs. With outside support possibly being seen as a 
more effective tool to help challengers than traditional PAC support, the result is lower 
winning percentages in all four categories. For PAC support the percentages for all four 
categories are very similar to the incumbent party winning percentage (those results are 
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listed in Table 18, right hand column). Overall, I believe that the key point is that in 
competitive races that winning percentage of the candidates with more outside support is 
greater (8.8 percentage points) than the candidates with more traditional PAC support.  
     Table 16 is important because it shows a comparison of PAC support to outside 
support in the same election cycle. Looking at the alignment of PAC support and outside 
support with winning candidates in the four categories, gives a side by side comparison 
of their effectiveness in the post Citizens United era. The results are important because 
they show again, that outside support is more aligned with winning candidates in truly 
competitive races. It would be expected that the most competitive races would get the 
most attention from a majority of large donors looking to influence electoral outcomes. 
By showing that outside spending is more effective than traditional PAC support in those 
races, the comparison shows how outside spending in the post Citizens United era can be 
a powerful tool to influence U.S. House of Representative elections.  
     After completing the data analysis for 2014 outside spending I did the same for 2016 
and 2018 to see if the results were similar or not. It is important to note that 2016 was a 
presidential year which can impact the entire campaign finance picture for that election 
cycle and the 2018 election cycle had its own unique characteristics because it was the 
midterm of a (deeply unpopular) president in his first term. 
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Table 17 
 2014 2016 2018 
 What percentage of the 
races did the candidate 
with more outside 
support win? 
 
What percentage of the 
races did the candidate 
with more outside 
support win? 
 
What percentage of the 
races did the candidate 
with more outside 
support win? 
 
Open Seats 68.3% 75% 80% 
Competitive 
Seats 
63.8% 55% 69.4% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
62.7% 58.9% * 
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
64% 55.4% * 
 
     The table 17 results show percentage increases for open seats from 2014 to 2016 and 
2016 to 2018, while there is a percentage decrease for all other categories. Although there 
are only three years of data available, the results for open seats show an upward trend in 
the winning percentage of the candidates with the most outside support (in individual 
races). This represents an increasing alignment of outside spending with winning 
candidates. I am curious as to whether or not that percentage will continue to rise, 
decrease, or stay relatively similar over the next couple election cycles. For competitive 
seats, it is interesting how the percentage decreases from 2014 to 2016 but then increase 
from 2016 to 2018. I am perplexed as to why the percentage would decrease in 2016 but 
then increase in 2018 (to an amount greater than 2016). The 2016 election cycle was a 
presidential election cycle, which could be a reason for way the results were so different 
in 2016. If this is the case, will the percentage decrease again in 2020? Unfortunately 
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spending ratio data was not yet available for 2018, so I could only complete the data 
analysis of the two spending ratio groups for 2014 and 2016. Both groups have slight 
decreases from 2014 to 2016 similar to the competitive seats category. Again, 2016 being 
a presidential election cycle could be a factor as to why the percentage decreases, but the 
decrease is interesting considering the widespread use of Super PACs (and other forms of 
outside spending) and the seemingly positive results for those entities in 2014.  
     One aspect of the results that stood out to me in particular was that percentages in 
2014 and 2016 for competitive seats and the 3:1 and below spending ratio seats were very 
similar. I think this is the case because there may be significant overlap between the 
competitive seats category and the 3:1 and below spending ratio category. After the 
competitive seats category I believe that the 3:1 and below spending ratio category would 
be the second most competitive category.  
     Table 16 is important because it uses three years of outside spending data to look for 
trends in outside spending in the post Citizens United era. Not only is it important to 
investigate outside spending compared to traditional PAC spending, but looking for 
trends in outside spending (for the three years of available data) gives a better picture of 
the campaign finance situation post Citizens United. Finding a trend for the three years 
post Citizens United, would strengthen the results of the comparison between traditional 
PAC support and outside spending support. By showing an increase and then a decrease 
in the winning percentage for candidates with the most outside spending in competitive 
races, the results show the importance of unique characteristic of election cycles to 
influence electoral outcomes.  
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     I became curious about the percentages of races (in the categories I was studying) 
where the incumbent party retained the seat. I was interested in this because I noticed that 
often when the incumbent lost, they had less outside spending support than the 
challenger. I choose to look at incumbent party rather than strictly incumbent candidate 
because one of the categories is open seats, therefore there are no incumbents in those 
races.  
Table 18 
 2006 2006 
 What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more PAC support 
win? 
What percentage of the races did 
the incumbent party retain the 
seat? 
Open Seats 83.8% 80% 
Competitive Seats 60.6% 55.7% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
84.3% 83.1% 
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
77.8% 76% 
 
     In 2006 the results show only a slight difference between the winning percentage of 
candidates with more PAC support and the incumbent party winning percentage, for 
opens seats, competitive seats and both spending ratio groups. The winning percentage 
for both PAC support and incumbent party are quite high in the open seat and spending 
ratio categories. It is interesting to note that again the percentages for the competitive 
seats were substantially less than the other categories. The incumbent party winning 
percentage was substantially lower for competitive seats, this is not surprising since 
competitive seats are often toss ups. The percentage of races where the candidate with 
more PAC support won are significantly lower in the competitive seats category than the 
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other categories, I believe that is because there were many races where the incumbent 
(party) had less PAC support and lost. I believe this is to be expected because overall the 
incumbent usually has more PAC support (opensecrets.org) and usually wins the race 
(opensecrets.org). In all categories the PAC support winning percentage and incumbent 
party winning percentage are quite similar. For competitive seats, the PAC support 
winning percentage is 4.9 percentage points greater than incumbent party winning 
percentage, I would speculate that the difference (though not that exact number) represent 
the challengers who had more PAC support and won.   
Table 19 
 2014 2014 
 What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more outside support 
win? 
What percentage of the races did 
the incumbent party retain the 
seat? 
Open Seats 68.3% 85.7% 
Competitive Seats 63.8% 55% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
62.7% 85.7% 
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
64% 84.8% 
 
     In 2014 the results show that the incumbent party winning percentage remains very 
high for races in the open seat and spending ratio categories. However, for competitive 
seats the incumbent party winning percentage is barely above 50% (nearly the same as 
2006). Again I believe this is because the races in the competitive seats category are truly 
competitive, which would be expected to result in a larger percentage of challengers 
winning than in the other categories. It is interesting that the candidates with more 
outside support had a greater winning percentage than the incumbent party in the 
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competitive seats categories. In the other categories the incumbent party had a very high 
winning percentage, even though the winning percentage of candidates with the most 
outside support is around twenty percentage points lower.  For the open seat and 
spending ratio categories, the incumbent party winning percentages were significantly 
greater than the winning percentage of the candidates with more outside support. This 
result shows that in those categories, incumbency is a greater indicator of success than 
outside support. However, it is very likely that in most races the incumbent party 
candidate had the most outside support.   
Table 20 
 
 2016 2016 
 What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more outside support 
win? 
What percentage of the races did 
the incumbent party retain the 
seat? 
Open Seats 75% 90% 
Competitive Seats 55% 75% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
58.9% 88.4% 
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
55.4% 85.1% 
 
     In 2016 the incumbent party winning percentage is very similar to to the 2014 
incumbent party winning percentage for the open seats category and both groups of the 
spending ratio category. Again the incumbent party winning percentage is significantly 
lower for the competitive seat races. However, the percentage has increased considerably 
form 2014, leaving a significant disparity between the winning percentage of the 
candidates with more outside support than their opponents, and incumbent party winning 
percentage. The open seats category has the greatest outside support winning percentage 
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and incumbent party winning percentage. Again, for the open seat and spending ratio 
categories, the incumbent party winning percentage was significantly greater than the 
winning percentage of the candidates with more outside support, showing that in those 
categories incumbency is a greater indicator of success than outside support. However, it 
is very likely that in many races the incumbent party candidate had the most outside 
support. Interestingly, for the competitive seats category the incumbent party winning 
percentage is much greater than the outside support winning percentage (this is very 
different than 2014). The 20 percentage point difference for competitive seats really 
stands out, it could potentially mean that in 2016 challengers had greater outside support 
than their incumbent opponents more than in previous election cycles, yet were less 
successful. There may be many reasons for the 20 percentage point difference for 
competitive seats in 2016, it could possibly be the result of 2016 being a presidential 
election, or a result of the individual characteristics of the competitive seat races in 2016.  
Table 21 
 2018 2018 
 What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more outside support 
win? 
What percentage of the races did 
the incumbent party retain the 
seat? 
Open Seats 80% 74% 
Competitive Seats 69.4% 47.2% 
7:1 and below 
spending ratio 
  
3:1 and below 
spending ratio 
  
 
     In 2018, for open seats both the outside support winning percentage and the 
incumbent party winning percentage remain quite high. However, the outside support 
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winning percentage is greater than incumbent party winning percentage which is different 
than 2014 and 2016. Again both percentages are significantly lower in the competitive 
seats category, with the incumbent party winning percentage being exceptionally lower. 
This may be because the 2018 midterms were the midterms in a president's first term 
which is a time when the president's party often loses many seats in the House of 
Representatives (McCarthy, 2017).  
     It is not surprising that a number of the seats flipped were considered competitive 
seats, which would cause such a low incumbent party winning percentage in the 2018 
competitive seat category. Because of the exceptionally low incumbent party winning 
percentage (for competitive seats) the outside support winning percentage was over 
twenty percentage points greater (nearly the opposite of 2016) showing that outside 
support could have played a significant role in helping challengers get their message to 
voters, contributing to their success. Unfortunately, for 2018 spending ratio data was not 
yet available so I could not answer the two questions in the table.  
     Tables 17-20 are important because they look at similarities/differences between PAC 
or outside support and incumbent party winning percentage. The goal was to see if there 
were changes between the years and the within the categories. Financial support and 
incumbency are both factors that strongly influence electoral outcomes. The results show 
variance among years and categories, but the common theme is that competitive seats 
stand out compared to open seat and spending ratio seats. This reinforces the trend from 
among the many comparisons in this thesis that truly competitive seats should be looked 
at differently than the categories that included seats with a wide variety of 
competitiveness.  
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Table 22 
 2006 2014 2016 2018  
 What 
percentage of 
the races did 
the incumbent 
party retain the 
seat? 
What 
percentage of 
the races did 
the incumbent 
party retain the 
seat? 
What 
percentage of 
the races did 
the incumbent 
party retain the 
seat? 
What 
percentage of 
the races did 
the incumbent 
party retain the 
seat? 
Average 
Open Seats 80% 85.7% 90% 74% 82.4% 
Competitive 
Seats 
55.7% 55% 75% 47.2% 58.2% 
7:1 and 
below 
spending 
ratio 
83.1% 85.7% 88.4%  85.7% 
3:1 and 
below 
spending 
ratio 
76% 84.8% 85.1%  81.9% 
 
     For the open seat and spending ratio categories there is an increase for incumbent 
party winning percentage from 2006 to 2014 and 2014 to 2016. For competitive seats 
there is a slight decrease from 2006 to 2014 and then a dramatic increase from 2014 to 
2016. Overall, the competitive seat percentages are less than the open seat and spending 
ratio races. Data were only available for open seats and competitive seats in 2018, for 
which both decreased dramatically. As I wrote below the previous table, I would 
speculate that the incumbent party winning percentages dropped dramatically in 2018 
because it was the midterm of a president in their first term, which is an election cycle 
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where the president's party usually does poorly. While there is some up and down, the 
incumbent party winning percentage in competitive seat races remains far below that of 
the other categories, implying that incumbency provides less of an advantage in those 
races, and therefore outside spending support could have a greater impact. 
     Campaign finance is one of many aspects of American politics. In this thesis I 
investigated the impact of the Citizens United Supreme Court decision on electoral 
outcomes. Citizens United is one of a number of major campaign finance court decisions 
(which I described in the introduction and literature review chapters), whose impact is 
fiercely debated. My research looks at the possible impacts of the decision on strictly 
U.S. House of Representatives races, which was narrowed to three categories: open seats, 
competitive seats, and spending ratio (which was divided into two groups). I compared 
the winning percentages of the candidates (in individual races) with the most PAC 
support, to the candidates with the most outside spending support, from four election 
cycles: 2006, 2014, 2016, 2018. I investigated the impact of outside spending in U.S. 
House of Representatives compared to the role of traditional PAC support, so see if 
outside spending was more aligned with winning candidates than traditional PAC 
support.  
     I believe that the key point from my findings is that outside spending was more 
aligned with winning candidates than PAC spending in the races in the competitive seats 
category. However, there was no significant difference in winning percentage for the 
open seats and spending ratio seats. The races in the competitive seats category were all 
truly competitive, whereas the races in the other categories greatly varied. Therefore, the 
outside spending was having an impact on electoral outcomes in those races that were 
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truly competitive. While the number of U.S. House of Representatives races each election 
that are truly competitive is small, they significantly affect the overall composition of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, because most races are not competitive because one 
candidate has a large advantage due to a number of factors. The ability of outside 
spending to be a major factor in determining electoral results, makes Citizens United a 
significant Supreme Court decision in shaping the role of money (specifically outside 
spending ) in U.S. House of Representatives elections.  
Hypotheses 
 
After reviewing the results of the data analysis I formed two hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
Super PACs (and other forms of outside spending) make it easier to inject large 
sums of money into U.S. House of Representatives races to support challengers; 
however, incumbent party reelection rates in open seat races and spending ratio 
races did not change substantially between 2006 and 2014.  
 
     There are a couple of reasons why I believe this to be the case. First, the changes made 
to U.S. campaign finance law by the Citizens United decision (and the subsequent 
creation and proliferation of Super PACs) reduced the barriers to spending large sums of 
money on political campaigns. Since there is less regulation of Super PACs than other 
political organizations like traditional PACs, Super PACs are seen as a better vehicle to 
influence elections. There are many factors that influence and determine the outcome of 
an election. Due to the incumbency advantage the incumbent will often be favored. 
Which means that the challenger will need all the help they can get (especially financial) 
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to have a legitimate chance at winning. The creation and proliferation of Super PACs 
brought about a new way (with minimal limitations) for donors to help challengers.  
     The data results show a lower winning percentage for candidate with more outside 
support in 2014 than PAC support in 2006, but incumbent party winning percentage is 
relatively similar. This led me to believe that substantially more money was being spent 
to support challengers in 2014, but their winning percentage was not much better than in 
2006. The significant changes to U.S. campaign finance law, mainly the creation and 
proliferation of Super PACs in 2014 which did not exist in 2006, means most of that 
support was most likely going through Super PACs.  
Hypothesis 2 
In races that are truly competitive, having more outside spending support can give 
a challenger a substantial boost, helping them unseat an incumbent. However, in 
races that are not truly competitive having more outside support does not 
substantially help a challenger unseat an incumbent. 
 
     Outside support matters most in races that are truly competitive. Comparing 2006 to 
2014 (PAC support to outside spending) in the categories with races varying in 
competitiveness (open seat and spending ratio categories) the candidates with more 
outside support had lower winning percentages than PAC support in 2006 in respective 
categories. However, the winning percentage increased in the competitive seats category. 
As the saying goes “Money in politics does not matter until it matters.” In those 
competitive races every last dollar of financial support can impact the race, making that 
support all the more important. But in races that are either non-competitive or barely 
competitive, after a certain point, each extra dollar has little impact on the electoral 
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outcome of the race. In some situations one candidate may have such an advantage that 
no matter how much financial support the disadvantaged candidate gets they still have no 
chance of winning.  
     There are many factors that influence the outcome of an election. If a candidate only 
has the advantage of the outside support factor, while the other candidate has the 
advantage in numerous factors (incumbency, name recognition, party enrollment totals 
etc…) than having an advantage in outside support will not significantly increase that 
candidate’s chances of winning (if at all). However, in truly competitive races, where the 
candidates are relatively even in terms of advantages in factors that influence elections, 
then having more outside spending can increase a candidate's chances of winning, more 
than having the most traditional PAC support.  
Limitations 
 
     In this final section of the data analysis chapter I will outline limitations and 
weaknesses of my research, and unexpected results. The major limitation/weakness is 
that the data analysis was all done by hand. I am not knowledgeable in any type of 
statistical data analysis process, therefore it was all done by hand. This has multiple 
consequences, foremost human error in the transferring of data and calculations. 
Additionally, the lack of spending ratio data for 2018, meant that I could not see if there 
was any trend for more than two years in that category. 
     The main unexpected result is that I thought open seats would be competitive, this is 
one reason why I chose that as one of the categories for my data analysis. But I learned 
that open seats greatly vary in their competitiveness, some are truly competitive, some 
are not competitive, and most are somewhere in the middle (Frazier, 2018). I expected 
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the lack of an incumbent to be a major factor that would make these races competitive, 
however, I learned that many of the open seats were districts that were never competitive 
due to party breakdown of voter enrollment, therefore the incumbent party could easily 
retain the seat (Gonzales, 2013). The growing number of U.S. House of Representatives 
races that lack competitiveness is written about by Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning, 
in a 2006 study titled Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. 
House Elections. They found that U.S. House of Representatives races are becoming less 
competitive overall because of internal migration, immigration, and ideological 
realignment. “Democratic districts have become more Democratic, Republican districts 
have become more Republican, and marginal districts have been disappearing as a result 
of powerful forces at work in American society” (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning, 
2006, p.77). 
     Another unexpected result was that the winning percentage of the candidate with more 
outside support in competitive seat races decreased in 2016 but then dramatically 
increased in 2018 (to a percentage greater than 2014). It is possible that was a result of 
2016 being a presidential election cycle, therefore it would be interesting to see what 
happens in 2020. Those  
results really stood out to me, and I am confused as to what caused them. 
     In my Data Analysis chapter I presented my results, and then discussed the results 
through comparisons. The comparisons are organized by year, question, or category. In 
most of the comparisons the open seats, and both spending ratio categories had similar 
results, while the competitive seats results were different. I believe this is because the 
open seats and spending ratio categories included races that greatly vary in their 
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competitiveness, while the competitive seats category races are all truly competitive. In 
the comparison between PAC support and outside support, the winning percentage would 
be greater for PAC support than outside support in the open seats and spending ratio 
categories, but greater for outside support in the competitive seats. For each comparison I 
discuss the results, importance, of the results, speculate about the results, and describe 
any unique characteristic of that particular election cycle. The discussion of the results 
leads to my two hypotheses, about outside spending helping challengers, and the ability 
of outside spending to play a crucial role in truly competitive races but being less 
effective in races where one candidate already has an overwhelming advantage. I finished 
the chapter with a discussion of limitations, weakness, and unexpected results.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
     In this thesis I investigated the impact of the Citizens United Supreme Court decision 
on electoral outcomes in U.S. House of Representatives races. My thesis question was, in 
House of Representatives races since the Citizens United decision, are the candidates 
with the most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 groups support (in individual 
races) winning more often than the candidates with the most traditional PAC funding in 
House of Representatives races before the Citizens United decision, comparing 2006 to 
2014?  
     I choose the topic of campaign finance and Citizens United because I am interested in 
the role that money plays in American elections. The Citizens United decision stands out 
because of the resulting creation and proliferation of Super PACs that allowed large sums 
of money to be injected into U.S. elections in support of and in opposition to, candidates 
and issues. Large donors can often have some degree of influence over politicians. 
Though Super PACs are not affiliated with a campaign, it is not difficult for candidates to 
find out who is financing advertisements for them or against their opponents. In some 
cases, Super PACs are run by former staffers (or even family members) of a candidate 
that they are supporting (opensecrets.org, 2017). 
     I analyzed campaign finance data to answer three questions: What percentage of the 
races did the candidate with more PAC support win? What percentage of the races did the 
candidate with more outside support win? What percentage of the races did the 
incumbent party retain the seat? There were three categories of House races: open seat 
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races, competitive races, and spending ratio races. The goal was to investigate a possible 
change in winning percentage from PAC support to outside spending support, by 
comparing the winning percentages from candidates with  
the most PAC support to candidates with the most outside support.  
      The results from the data analysis were different for the competitive seat races than 
the open seat races and spending ratio races. This is because the competitive seat races 
were all truly competitive, while the other two categories were made up of seats varying 
in competitiveness. When comparing PAC support in 2006 to outside support in 2014, 
the results showed that in the competitive races the candidates with more outside support 
did win more than the candidates with more traditional PAC support, however, for the 
other categories there was actually a decrease in winning percentage. The comparison of 
PAC support in 2006 to PAC support in 2014 showed that in competitive races PAC 
support was less aligned with winning candidates, but more aligned in the other 
categories. Comparing 2014 PAC and outside support showed that outside support was 
more aligned with winning candidate than PAC support in competitive races, but the 
opposite was true in the other categories. The overall trend of outside support (2014, 
2016, 2018) was an increase in winning percentage in open seats, while decreasing and 
then increasing in competitive seats. There were very mixed results for the incumbent 
party winning percentage comparisons. In some cases, the outside spending winning 
percentage was greater than the incumbent party winning percentage, but in other cases it 
was the opposite. The results really varied depending on the category and the year.  
     To address my thesis question, I believe the best answer from the data analysis results 
is that in truly competitive races the candidates with more outside support have a greater 
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winning percentage than the candidates with more traditional PAC support, in midterm 
elections (2014 and 2018). In 2016 the winning percentage for candidates with the most 
outside support was actually lower than PAC support in 2006, it is possible that 2016 is 
different because it was a presidential election. In open seat races and spending ratio 
races however, there was no significant change in winning percentage. 
     The results led me to form two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is about the ability of 
outside spending to benefit challengers more so than incumbents. Incumbents almost 
always have large financial “war chest.” However, the deregulated nature of outside 
spending (particularly Super PACs) may benefit challengers by allowing large sums of 
money from various organizations or donors to be spent in support of challengers, 
improving their chance of success on election day. The second hypothesis is about the 
effect of having more outside support than an opponent. Having more outside support can 
help a challenger unseat an incumbent, more so than having more traditional PAC 
support, but only in truly competitive races. In races that are not truly competitive having 
the advantage in only the outside spending factor does not provide a substantial boost. In 
races in which both candidates are evenly matched, having more outside support can 
increase a challenger’s chances of winning the race. Both hypotheses point to ways in 
which the Citizens United decision can impact electoral outcomes in U.S. House of 
Representative races. 
     Since it is very expensive to run federal political campaigns in the U.S., campaign 
finance play a major role in the overall election process. The larger funders can have 
influence over politicians. The Citizens United Supreme Court decision stands out 
because it held that the First Amendment allows corporations, non-profits, and labor 
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unions, to provide independent expenditures to promote or attack political candidates, 
without government restrictions, thus effectively overturning a number of previous 
campaign finance Supreme Court rulings. The impact of the resulting creation and 
proliferation of Super PACs (which can raise an unlimited amount of money from 
corporations, unions, non-profits, and individuals) to spend on  
elections advocating for or against candidates, is what I investigated in this thesis.  
     My data analysis results show the potential impact of the Citizens United decision on 
U.S. House of Representatives races. The increase in the winning percentage of 
candidates with the most PAC support compared to most outside spending support (but 
only in competitive races) shows that the Citizens United decision appears to have in 
some ways had an impact on electoral outcomes in U.S. House of representative races. 
By impacting actual electoral outcomes the Citizens United decision appears to have 
increased the strength and influence of outside spending on elections. The outside 
spending that goes through Super PACs is often large contributions from individuals, 
corporations, or labor unions. This means that these organization may gain more 
influence in American politics. The ability of political donors to gain influence over 
politicians leading to corruption, was one reason for the implementation of an extensive 
set of campaign finance regulations in the U.S., in the first place.  
     The so what question asks why is my thesis important. It is important because it 
investigates how a major Supreme Court campaign finance decision can impact elections 
across the country. These are House of Representatives elections, sending members to the 
House that will write policy that affects Americans across the country. Therefore, 
changing campaign finance law can cause a chain reaction impacting all aspects of the 
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American political system. To investigate how the changes brought about by the Citizens 
United decision may be having real impacts on electoral outcomes is important because 
its looks at how Supreme Court campaign finance decisions can impact elections, in turn 
affecting the outcomes of those elections.   
     After reviewing my data analysis process and the results I found a number of 
directions for future research, questions unanswered, and big picture questions. 
Directions for future research include more specific data analysis questions. For example, 
in Tables 16-20 I compare the results from two questions, PAC support and outside 
spending support to incumbent party winning percentage. Those questions could be 
combined, to find the success of incumbent party candidates with the most PAC support 
or outside spending support. Combining the questions to create a more specific category 
of races could be a way to more clearly determine the success of those incumbent party 
candidates with more PAC support or more outside support. The same could be done 
with challengers to see how challengers with more outside support or PAC support 
compared to challengers with less of that kind of support than their incumbent opponent.  
     Another direction for future research would be using different House race categories. I 
used three categories: open seats, competitive, and spending ratio (which was broken into 
two groups, 7:1 and below and 3:1 and below). First, the spending ratio could be 
narrowed to 2:1 or even 1:1, the narrower the category gets the more competitive the 
races would be expected to be. In my data analysis the results showed the most impact on 
the competitive seats races, therefore narrowing the spending ratio category would be a 
different way to create a category of predominantly competitive races. Additionally, other 
categories would include political affiliation. Looking at the political parties separately 
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could be used to investigate the relationship of each political party with PAC and outside 
spending, and to see their success at holding and/or flipping seats based on outside 
spending.  
     A different direction for future research would be using data from future elections. In 
certain parts of the data analysis, the results were much different in 2016. I speculated 
that this could be because 2016 was a presidential election cycle, while all the other 
election cycles I analyzed were midterms. The 2020 elections are looming on the horizon, 
which will be a presidential year. It would be interesting to see if the results for 2020 
would be similar to 2016, if so, that would put more weight behind the speculation that 
presidential elections impact electoral outcomes in regard to outside spending differently 
than midterm elections. Alternatively, the 2020 results might not be similar to 2016, but 
could still be very different from the midterm election cycles studied. Studying future 
elections would help to solidify trends in the data results, or if results varied, would show 
how the unique characteristic of each election cycle impacts the spending which can in 
turn impact electoral outcomes.  
     I end this conclusion chapter, and therefore my thesis, with some big picture questions 
about campaign finance and Citizens United in relation to my thesis. First, did the 
Citizens United decision really help challengers? Future research could more closely 
investigate this question. Second, what could be the role of outside spending in the 2020 
election? It will be interesting to see data from the 2020 election cycle on outside 
spending and winning candidates. Third, while the Citizens United decision appears to 
have helped challengers who are already competitive, what are the prospects for it to 
increase the number of competitive races, through boosting challenger’s chances of 
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winning? Fourth, how does the impact of outside spending compare to unique electoral 
characteristics? The are many factors that impact electoral outcomes, with outside 
spending being just one factor, and different factors can be more important in different 
election cycles. Fifth, will there be congressional action to address outside spending and 
the Citizens United decision? There is a substantial amount of discontent over the amount 
of outside spending in U.S. elections by the public, but so far there does not seem to be 
much concern in Congress. Sixth, Could outside spending play a greater role in less 
competitive races in the future? All of these questions could lead to future research. But 
for now the Citizens United decision will remain to some degree an influencing factor in 
U.S. House of Representatives races. The extent of the impact of the Citizens United 
decision will continue to be researched and investigated.  
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